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Abstract This paper discusses whether a copyright compensation system (CCS) for
recorded music—endowing private Internet subscribers with the right to download
and use works in return for a fee—would be welfare increasing. It reports on the results
of a discrete choice experiment conducted with a representative sample of the Dutch
population consisting of 4986 participants. Under some conservative assumptions, we
find that applied only to recorded music, a mandatory CCS could increase the welfare
of rights holders and users in the Netherlands by over €600 million per year (over €35
per capita). This far exceeds current rights holder revenues from the market of
recorded music of ca. €144 million per year. A monthly CCS fee of ca. €1.74 as a
surcharge on Dutch Internet subscriptions would raise the same amount of revenues to
rights holders as the current market for recorded music. With a voluntary CCS, the
estimated welfare gains to users and rights holders are even greater for CCS fees below
€20 on the user side. A voluntary CCS would also perform better in the long run, as it
could retain a greater extent of market coordination. The results of our choice ex-
periment indicate that a well-designed CCS for recorded music would simultaneously
make users and rights holders better off. This result holds even if we correct for
frequently observed rates of overestimation in contingent valuation studies.
The first part of this title paraphrases The Clash’s ‘‘Should I stay or should I go’’
(Mellor and Jones 1982).
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1 Introduction
A fundamental question in copyright industries is how to cope with the widespread
use of digital information and communication technology (ICT) for unauthorized
copying. Over 15 years ago, the explosive growth of the file-sharing network
Napster put the issue on the agenda of policy makers and stakeholders. So far,
neither private nor public copyright enforcement measures have resolved the issue.
Copyrights holders face a tough choice between continuing to try and enforce
exclusive rights in the digital realm or exploring alternatives, such as the one
discussed in this paper.
This paper discusses whether a copyright compensation system (CCS) for
recorded music—endowing private Internet subscribers with the right to download
and use works in return for a fee—would be welfare increasing under current market
conditions. It reports the results of a discrete choice experiment conducted with a
representative sample of the Dutch population consisting of 4986 participants. The
Internet penetration rate in the Netherlands is 95 %, one of the highest worldwide
(Eurostat 2014a, b). The Netherlands also entertains a system of levies on copying
technology, so that basic elements of a CCS should be familiar to many residences.
We find that applied only to recorded music, a mandatory CCS could increase the
welfare of rights holders and users in the Netherlands by over €600 million per year
(over €35 per capita). This far exceeds the current sales value of recorded music of
ca. €144 million. Even if a CCS were to substitute all of the current sales of
recorded music and provided no cost-savings, it could simultaneously increase user
welfare and rights holder revenues at a price that constitutes a reasonable surplus
split. According to our results, this is achieved over a broad range of CCS user fees,
for example between ca. €1.74 and €9.25 for a CCS that is mandatory for all
households with Internet subscription.
Some market conditions in the Netherlands make this result particularly
noteworthy. On the one hand, during data collection, unauthorized private copying
from unlawful sources was not outlawed in contrast to some other European
countries. On the other hand, the digital market for recorded music in the
Netherlands is relatively advanced. In 2012, the year preceding data collection, the
digital market in the Netherlands already accounted for 31 % of all revenues in the
primary market for recorded music, in which authorized services make copies of
recordings available to end users (IFPI 2013). Given lower average retail prices for
digital copies, the share of ‘‘digital’’ in unit sales would be higher. Music
subscription services and ad-supported online music services accounted for 54 % of
digital revenues.1 Residents of the Netherlands thus report substantial willingness to
pay (WTP) for participation in a compensation system covering recorded music, in
1 Extrapolating recent trends, the share of the digital market was probably greater in November 2013,
when data were collected (IFPI 2013).
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spite of (1) virtually no legal risk associated with private copying from unlawful
sources at the time of data collection, and (2) availability and widespread use of
authorized digital music services and in particular music subscriptions.
The paper is structured as follows: Sect. 2 briefly discusses digitization in the
copyright industries and the literature on CCS. Section 3 describes the application
and limitation of contingent valuation methods to value untraded goods and discrete
choice experiments in particular, and provides information on the method and data
used in this paper. Section 4 describes basic results, and Sect. 5 presents estimates
of the effect of several CCS options on user welfare and rights holder revenues.
Section 6 discusses a number of limitations and extensions to our assessment.
Section 7 presents main conclusions.
2 Literature
2.1 The economics of copyright and digitization
Copyright works are quasi-public goods: important aspects of them are hard to
exclude and non-rival in consumption.2 Copyright works are information goods
with the typical cost structure of high, sunk development costs compared to low
costs of reproduction and dissemination. According to basic economic theory, this is
associated with market failure due to insufficient social coordination in the
provision of public goods. Individually, rational users will opt for unauthorized use
without compensating rights holders. Many investing in socially efficient creation
and authorized dissemination of copyright works are unable to recoup sunk costs. In
the short run, regarding existing creative works, unrestricted use is socially optimal
(Arrow 1962), since establishing exclusive rights and trading of rights generates a
deadweight loss. In the long run, insufficient incentives to supply quasi-public
works may be associated with misallocation and welfare loss. A CCS is one way to
develop a compromise between the underutilization of existing works and the
underproduction of new creative works (Novos and Waldman 1984).
The diffusion of digital ICT aggravates the public good attributes of reproducible
creative works. The most apparent effect of digitization is to lower the costs of
reproduction and dissemination of copyright works. The costs of creating new
works also fall but—due to the labor-intensive nature of the creation process
(Baumol and Bowen 1966)—remain substantially higher than the costs of
reproduction and dissemination.
Most private and public enforcement initiatives, such as technical protection
measures, litigation-based enforcement, or graduated response systems, have not
been cost-efficient. They conflict with the privacy of information exchanges online
and raise difficult questions about the responsibility of Internet service providers
2 Fundamental contributions to the economics of copyright are Novos and Waldman (1984) and Landes
and Posner (1989). A recent literature survey is Towse et al. (2008). Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006) discuss
the economic theory of piracy. Recent literature reviews regarding the empirical literature on copying and
copyright are Handke (2012) and Watson et al. (2014).
J Cult Econ (2016) 40:227–259 229
123
(ISP) regarding copyright infringements by users of their services. There are also
problems in enforcing national law online.
One of the greatest challenges in estimating the welfare effect of any copyright
system is developing a measure of the value of the creative works supplied because
of copyright. We find that there is ample scope for CCS to simultaneously increase
user welfare and rights holder revenues. Making the basic assumption that the law
of supply holds for copyright works—in the sense that greater revenues to rights
holder will result in greater supply of valuable, new creative works—any CCS that
generates greater rights holder revenues would thus have dynamic benefits. The
welfare gains estimated in this paper would be sustainable. Whether there would be
additional dynamic benefits depends on the extent to which participants in the
choice experiment managed to incorporate long-run effects on the supply of works
into their evaluation.
2.2 Copyright compensation systems
The basic idea of CCS is to reward rights holders for unauthorized use of copyright
works, where either the enforcement of exclusive rights and by extension direct
market transactions between rights holders and users are too costly; see Handke
et al. (2013) for an extensive discussion and literature review. More or less detailed
suggestions of CCS include Lunney (2001), Ku (2002), Netanel (2003), Fisher
(2004), Eckersley (2004), and Aigrain (2008, 2012).3
Private copying levies (PCL) on copying hardware are a type of CCS that already
exists in the USA, Canada, and the majority of European countries. For an overview
across numerous countries, see WIPO (2013). However, in most countries, PCL do
not legalize copies made from so-called unlawful sources, such as peer-to-peer
networks. In the Netherlands, copies from unlawful sources were not explicitly
excluded when we collected data in 2013; the issue was contentious at the time, and
later jurisdiction has clarified that copies from unlawful sources are not covered by
domestic PCL.4 The scale and scope of private copying levies tends to be greatest in
Europe. While levies do often apply to ICT hardware, no levies have yet been
introduced to Internet subscription.
CCS does not establish an obligation to pay copyright royalties with acquisition
or use of works, which is difficult to monitor. We discuss CCS options that apply to
Internet subscription, as suggested for example by Netanel (2003) and that include
copies from many sources that are ‘‘unlawful’’ at this time.5 The CCS would endow
participating users with the right to download copyright works from the Internet and
use them for non-commercial purposes, in return for a surcharge on Internet
subscriptions. We vary a number of other CCS options in our empirical work, see
Sect. 3.
3 Widely discussed commissioned reports include Modot et al. (2011) and Spindler (2013).
4 See the ruling of the Dutch Hoge Raad der Nederlanden in the case ACI Adams versus Stichting de
Thuiskopie; online: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-435/12.
5 Netanel (2003) suggests levies similar to PCL but applied to Internet subscription. Eckersley (2004) and
Fisher (2004) discuss taxation. Ku (2002) suggests revenue sharing between copyrights holders and
suppliers of goods and services that are frequently used to disseminate works.
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For rights holders, the most direct benefit of a CCS is that it generates income
associated with unauthorized uses online. A CCS can also reduce all types of
transaction costs for rights holders and users, by standardization and bundling of
transactions (see the following discussion of collective rights management). For
users, the most direct benefit of a CCS is that it reduces legal risks when accessing
or disseminating copyright works online.6 Effective compensation of creators/rights
holders could also benefit users. First and foremost, compensation of rights holders
could mitigate any problem with underproduction of non-excludable creative works.
Furthermore, survey data consistently suggest that users do have a preference for
compensating creators (e.g., Rochelandet and le Guel 2005; Hennig-Thurau et al.
2007; Fetscherin 2009). A CCS could thus be a benefit to users in its own right.
A CCS could also mitigate costly social conflict over copyright, including the
burden on the taxpayer from litigation.
In essence, CCS is an extension of collective rights management that is a long-
standing practice in parts of the market for copyright works. CCS differs from a
situation with direct transactions between rights holders and users in two ways. On
the one hand, a CCS generates a blanket license covering a large repertoire of works
from many rights holders and establishes standardized terms of use, reducing the
scope for individual bargaining. On the other hand, a CCS requires an intermediary
organization that sets these standard terms and administers copyrights.
Standardization of prices and other terms of use is a two-edged sword (Blind
2004). On the one hand, it can reduce transaction costs compared to direct
transactions between individual suppliers and users—including monitoring and
enforcement costs but also search, bargaining, and contracting costs. On the other
hand, standards are associated with less flexibility and offset the market mechanism.
Economists have been critical of CCS in particular because it restricts price setting
through the market with a less adaptive standard and may thus be associated with
misallocation of resources (Liebowitz 2003, 2005; Merges 2004; Liebowitz and
Watt 2006). A CCS standard reduces the scope for tailoring prices and terms of
trade to the specific situation of individual rights holders and users. It may inhibit
adaptations to changing market conditions over time. This holds in particular where
CCS participation is mandatory for users and/or rights holders. Therefore, we also
discuss voluntary CCS on the user side, which are more efficient in this respect.
Furthermore, a CCS requires a copyright management organization (CMO) that
fulfills similar functions of existing collecting societies. The economics of CMO are
discussed in Besen and Kirby (1989), Besen et al. (1992), Watt (2000), Handke and
Towse (2007), and Handke (2014). Functions of CMO are to set prices and standard
terms, monitor use of copyright works, collect royalties, and distribute them among
rights holders. Existing CMO tends not to provide sorting functions, which has
received much attention in the microeconomics of intermediation: They do not
provide signals of quality to users by including works based on the assessments of
quality. Instead, they exploit economies of scale in the administration of copyrights,
6 To be sure, in the Netherlands, legal risks associated with unauthorized use for private purposes were
very limited at the time when data were collected. However, it was also clear that stronger copyright
enforcement could be introduced in the foreseeable future in response to rights holder lobbying and
international legislation affecting the Netherlands.
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and they reduce the number of transactions, where rights holders and users with
multiple potential trading partners only interact with the CMO.
Running a CMO is costly, however. Due to economies of scale and network
effects associated with rights administration, CMO may enjoy extensive market
power both on the rights holder and user side, requiring regulation. As large
organizations with multiple stakeholders, CMO may also exhibit inertia and slow
decision making.
Another problem associated with collective rights management is that a CMO
would have to distribute royalties among rights holders based on incomplete
information on actual use. The CMO would have to develop a system to monitor use
online among a representative sample of users (monitoring all users probably being
too costly and raising similar privacy issues as those associated with conventional
copyright enforcement). The same problem does not occur with direct transactions
between rights holders and users. Yet, the very reason that a CCS is of interest is
that rights holders have found it prohibitively costly to control use. That is, an
effective CCS will increase rights holder revenues but may distort the market if its
distribution of revenues is less proportional to actual use of copyright works than
with direct transactions.
Summarizing these arguments regarding the efficiency of CMO and CCS in
particular, Handke et al. (2013) speak of a simplicity–flexibility trade-off. CCS
simplifies markets by limiting the options of market participants and associating
royalty payments with activities that are more easily monitored than the nature of
information exchanges online.
Neither the status quo with frequent unauthorized use and costly copyright
enforcement measures, nor a CCS with standardized terms of use and a central
intermediary are first-best options. Overall, it is an empirical question whether CCS
would increase social welfare compared to the status quo.
3 Methods
3.1 Contingent valuation through discrete choice experiments
The debate on CCS suffers from a lack of credible empirical evidence. Noteworthy
empirical work on CCS includes Karaganis and Renkema (2012), Entertainment
Media Research (2011), and STIM (2012). They all find that a substantial share of
the respective samples report willingness to pay (WTP) equivalent to several Euros
per month for some type of license to access copyright works online with fewer
legal restrictions than today. All of these studies are limited in two respects: First,
they only cover a narrow range of CCS options; second, the methods of eliciting
WTP differ from the recommended standard of contingent valuation of untraded
goods (Alberini and Kahn 2009; Arrow and Solow 1993; Bateman et al. 2002;
Throsby 2003).
We conducted a discrete choice experiment covering a wide range of CCS
options. We are thus able to identify and focus on more promising combinations of
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CCS attributes, and to develop measures of WTP and the welfare implications of
these options using state-of-the-art methods in contingent valuation.
Conjoint analysis (CA) has in the last two decades established itself as a robust
and well-tested survey method to elicit reliable marginal WTP for different
attributes and attribute levels of complex products. Besides its widespread
commercial use, it is increasingly utilized in policy research. Discrete choice
experiments are among the best methods to evaluate goods that are untraded, either
because they have not been released to markets or because they have public good
attributes (Bateman et al. 2002; Harrison and Rutstro¨m 2008). 7 They best resemble
real market choices and reduce the scope for strategic responses. See Noonan (2003)
for a meta-study of contingent valuation studies regarding the cultural sector.
As with any stated preference method, results have to be interpreted with caution.
Most importantly for the topic at hand, contingent valuation surveys tend to
overestimate WTP. The influential Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s
(NOAA 1996) blue-ribbon panel recommended division by 2 if data cannot be
calibrated against real market data. In two widely cited meta-studies, Little and
Berrens (2004) and Murphy et al. (2005a, b) estimated central tendencies in a
number of contingent valuation applications. Mean bias was overestimation of WTP
by a factor of 3.13 for the former and 3.26 for the latter paper. The median in
Murphy et al. (2005a, b) was much lower at 1.50; however, much of the mean
overestimation is due to a minority of studies dealing with high-value goods.
Our choice experiment combines aspects that have been associated with high
overestimation in previous studies, as well as aspects that have been associated with
low overestimation. First and foremost, Murphy et al. (2005a, b: 323) find: ‘‘For
smaller hypothetical values that are common in CV studies, our results suggest that
hypothetical bias may not be a major problem.’’ In their analysis, WTP
overestimation in contingent valuation studies increases exponentially with payment
amounts.8 On average, they find no overestimation for hypothetical values up to
US$10 and overestimation rises to two for hypothetical values of US$32.50. The
amounts covered in this survey are relatively low, ranging between €5 and €30. By
itself, this should be associated with lower overestimation compared to the average
across all contingent valuation studies included in meta-analyses, even though some
uncertainty remains due to a large variance of overestimation. What is more, we
used a discrete choice referendum design, which is associated with significantly
lower overestimation in meta-studies (List and Gallet 2001; Little and Berrens 2004;
Murphy et al. 2005a, b).
7 CCS for online use of copyright works has not been adopted in any relevant market. CCS has public
good attributes, since they facilitate the financing of the production of non-excludable creative works.
8 Murphy et al. (2005a, b: 323) find that ‘‘the evidence is quite strong that there is a positive quadratic
relationship between hypothetical values and hypothetical bias.’’ Hypothetical values in studies covered
by Murphy et al. (2005a, b: 316) range between .08 and 301, with a mean of 26.55. The regression
coefficient for hypothetical bias (overestimation) with hypothetical value as independent variable is .498
and significant at the 1 % level. With the square of hypothetical value as the independent variable, the
coefficient is .046 and significant at the 10% level (n = 77). Murphy et al. (2005a, b) do not distinguish
currencies, which complicates the interpretation. Nominal values are probably less important than
purchasing power or the share of the hypothetical value in disposable income.
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On the other hand, a CCS license is an unfamiliar and complex quasi-public good
that is challenging to evaluate. Choice experiments tend to produce more valid
results regarding WTP if results are presented as directly affecting policy
(consequentiality). For ethical considerations, we were unable to pretend to
participants in the choice experiment that there were specific plans to introduce a
CCS in the Netherlands, which may be associated with relatively great hypothetical
bias. Due to concern with the overall length of the questionnaire, no ‘‘cheap talk’’
design was adopted.9 In the following, we first report the pure empirical results and
relate these to typical overestimation rates in the conclusions.
3.2 Data collection
In the choice experiment, the payment mechanism of the CCS was defined as a
surcharge to the Internet subscription payment, which would be associated with
least transaction costs among users. Respondents were informed that the
operations of the CCS and the distribution of revenues would occur under
statutory regulation.
Respondents were randomly assigned to different treatments. See Fig. 1 for an
overview, which highlights the treatments and attribute expressions considered in
this paper. The CCS was defined as either mandatory for all Internet subscribers, or
as voluntary so that users could decide themselves whether to pay the fee and
acquire the CCS license. The voluntary scenario had two subtypes: one, where the
enforcement of copyright among private end users was to be strengthened among
users opting out of the CCS, and one where no change to copyright enforcement was
mentioned. Regarding pricing, we distinguished between a single, fixed CCS license
fee and metered pricing in the choice experiment. We focus on results for the flat
CCS fee throughout this paper.
In the conjoint survey proper, the following CCS attributes and attribute
expressions were varied10; see Appendix 1 for an overview of the formulations
exhibited in the choice experiment:
3.2.1 Allowed uses
This attribute covers the rights provided by a CCS to the participating users. It has
three levels: (1) downloading only; (2) downloading and sharing, covering the rights
of making accessible and communication to the public; and (3) downloading,
sharing, and modification, covering the right to create and disseminate derivative
works.
9 ‘‘Cheap talk’’ scripts inform respondents of hypothetical bias and exaggerated reports of WTP in
contingent valuation methods, and remind respondents to avoid overstating their WTP. This method has
only been found effective in reducing WTP overestimation for larger payment amounts. Abbreviated
‘‘cheap talk’’ scripts have been associated with greater overestimation (Murphy et al. 2005a, b).
10 See Quintais (2013) for an excellent overview and legal analysis that inspired the development of
attributes for this survey.
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3.2.2 Subject matter
This attribute also has three levels: (1) recorded music only; (2) recorded music and
audiovisual works; and (3) recorded music, audiovisual works, and books. We focus
on the results for recorded music in this paper.
3.2.3 Catalogue completeness
This attribute concerns the extent to which a CCS license covers existing works.
The three levels are: (1) complete catalogue; (2) temporal restrictions, e.g., novelties
only being covered after a delay; and (3) incomplete catalogue, referring to
permanent limitations in the coverage of the CCS license.
3.2.4 Monitoring
With metered pricing, personalized monitoring is necessary to establish the price an
individual user is to pay. With fixed pricing, some monitoring is required to develop
an efficient distribution of CCS revenues among rights holders, which can be
achieved through anonymized monitoring of a random sample. For the fixed
payment option, we thus addressed the issue of monitoring through two levels: (1)
any CCS participation is associated with monitoring of user behavior and
anonymized analysis; (2) there is explicit mention of a statutory guarantee of no
monitoring.
3.2.5 Distribution of revenues
This attribute has two levels: (1) The CCS contains a statutory guarantee that
original creators receive at least 50 % of the CCS revenues; (2) original creators are
free to negotiate the revenue split with investors or intermediaries (such as
publishers or record companies).
3.2.6 Price
The choice experiment covers six equidistant price points from €5 to €30.
Fig. 1 Overview of treatments and conjoint aspects of the discrete choice experiment
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For the conjoint analysis aspect of choice experiment, we created an efficient
choice design with 54 choice sets, 27 for the fixed payment scenario and 27 for the
metered payment scenario. Respondent were randomly presented with 12 choice
sets that each consisted of two, utility balanced CCS options and a ‘‘choose none’’
option.
3.3 The sample
We conducted the choice experiment on the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the
Social Sciences (LISS) panel, a longitudinal panel survey comparable to the Panel
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in the USA or the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP). For a documentation of the LISS panel, see CentERdata (2014). The
panel consists of a representative sample of the Dutch population (including those
without Internet connection). Panel members complete an online questionnaire
every month, and our questions were incorporated into the questionnaire of
November 2013. Panel members are paid for each completed questionnaire.11 Our
survey was reviewed, programmed, and conducted by the panel administrator
CentERdata. Our sample was comprised of all 6216 active panel members at the
time aged 16 years or older. The participation rate was 79.9 %, and 4858
respondents (78.2 %) completed the choice experiment and responded to all other
survey questions (completion rate: 78.2 %; incomplete: 1.7 %). This turnout and
results for follow-up questions regarding the comprehensibility of the questionnaire
were better than average for questionnaires delivered through the LISS panel.12
3.4 Choice modeling
Attribute-based discrete choice models such as conjoint analysis are based on
random utility theory (McFadden 1974) and Lancaster’s theories of demand and
consumer theory (Lancaster 1966, 1971). They are compatible with both utility
maximization by decision makers (Train 2003) and utility decomposition by
alternative attributes or characteristics (Loureiro and Umberger 2007). Following
Train’s (2003) canonical exposition, a decision maker, n, faces a choice among J
alternatives, from each of which she can obtain certain levels of utility. The utility
that decision maker n obtains from alternative j is Unj, j = 1,…, J, and she chooses
the alternative that yields highest utility, so alternative i will be chosen if and only if
Uni [Unj 8 j 6¼ i.
The assumption is that the decision maker knows the utility provided by each
alternative. The model, though, does not account for the direct observation of such
utility but only of certain attributes of the alternatives, xnj 8j and some
11 Where necessary for participation, LISS panel members are provided with suitable ICT.
12 There are indications of potential non-response bias. Non-respondents are significantly younger, still
studying, or being autonomous professionals, freelancers, or self-employed, still living with their parents
or with their unwedded partners in larger cities. It seems the ‘‘digital natives’’ are thus underrepresented in
our sample. On the other hand, older, widowed people, and those living in rural environment are
overrepresented. Since the latter characteristics correlate with a low probability of accepting any CCS
option, this is probably a source of underestimation of WTP in our data.
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characteristics of the decision maker, mn. There are unobserved features of utility,
so that Unj = Vnj, and utility has an observed and an unobserved component,
Unj = Vnj ? enj, where enj represents the difference between the actual utility Unj
and the utility captured by Vnj. The error term of the model, enj 8j, is unknown
quantity and treated as a random variable. The vector of all values of the unobserved
component for all alternatives is enj = {en1,…, enJ} and has density f(en), with which
we can make probability statements about the choice of the decision maker. Then,
the probability that the decision maker n chooses alternative i is:
Pni ¼ ProbðUni [Unj 8 j 6¼ iÞ
¼ ProbðVni þ eni [Vnj þ enj 8 j 6¼ iÞ
¼ Probðenj  eni\Vni  Vnj 8 j 6¼ iÞ
This probability is a cumulative distribution, and using the density f(en) and
assuming that each enj is independently, identically distributed extreme value, we
obtain the basic conditional logit model, where the probability that a decision maker
chooses alternative j (in a choice set K) containing z attributes is:
Pðyn ¼ jÞ ¼ expðzjÞP
j2K exp(zJÞ
with zj = bxj, where xj is the value of the attribute x for alternative j and coefficient
b represents the effect of x on the choice of an alternative in a choice set K.
Using Elff’s (2013) mclogit algorithm for the R statistical programming language
(R Core Team 2014), we fit a conditional logit model of choice on the six different
attributes described above. Following Haaijer et al. (2001), a no-choice constant is
included to reduce potential bias in the estimates for the attributes. The empirical
specification of our model is:
Unj ¼ b1AU þ b2SM þ b3CC þ b4MT þ b5DR þ b6Price þ b7NC þ enj
where the variables affected by the coefficients b1 to b6 stand for the six different
alternative-specific attributes (e.g., AU = allowed uses, SM = subject matter), NC
is the constant for the no-choice option, and enj is the unobserved, error term. The
model can provide (1) logistic coefficients that point to the marginal effect of
changes in attribute levels on the indirect utility Unj; (2) the WTP associated with a
change in an attribute level in price terms—i.e., the ratio between the parameter of
the attributes and the price parameter; and (3) average probabilities of acceptance
for all alternatives, so that it is possible to post-estimate these probabilities at
different price points.
4 Basic results of the choice experiments
Appendix 2 presents the parameter estimates for all attribute expressions and for the
various subsamples, within the fixed payment treatment, including filmed
entertainment and books. Regardless of the type of participation, on average,
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respondents show preference for being able to download a package of content
including music and audiovisual material from a temporally restricted catalogue,
without monitoring, without a guaranteed minimum share of original creators in
revenues, and at a low price. Sensitivity toward price is very stable across all
subsamples, but attributes such as the allowed uses, the completeness of the
catalogue, and payment of artists show interesting patterns. For instance, a complete
catalogue provides respondents with significantly higher utility than a partial
catalogue when participation in the CCS is mandatory, while the effect of this
change in attribute levels approaches zero or simply dissipates when participation is
voluntary, with or without strict enforcement.13
Following the standard procedure (e.g., Telser and Zweifel 2002; Lagerkvist
et al. 2006), we compute estimates of the marginal WTP associated with
changes in each attribute by dividing each attribute’s marginal utility by the
price coefficient.
In this paper, we are focusing on a specific range of CCS options. We consider
only recorded music. We only assess a fixed price charged on the user side, which
would be easier to implement than metered pricing. We only consider freely
negotiated revenue sharing between original creators and other rights holders, as the
discussion of CCS pricing that would fully compensate rights holders is more
complicated with regulation of revenue shares. Within the range of remaining
options, we identify the most valuable CCS option that covered in the choice
experiment, and check whether it would simultaneously increase rights holder and
user welfare. We also compare results between a situation in which this CCS option
is mandatory or voluntary on the user side.
In order to rank alternatives by their popularity among respondents, we used two
alternative methods. First, we calculated the times each unique combination of
attributes (i.e., each alternative) was chosen relative to the times the combination of
attributes was presented in choice sets. Second, from the conditional logit results,
we predicted the probability of acceptance of each alternative presented in each
choice set, from which we derived average probabilities for each unique alternative.
Both methods yielded the same result regarding the most popular option. In
particular, respondents showed most preference for the combination of attributes
that included: (1) the right to download and share (AU = download and share); (2)
only music (SM = music); (3) from a catalogue with temporal restrictions
(CC = temporal restrictions)14; (4) with fixed revenue guaranteed to artists
(PA = guarantee); (5) with no monitoring (MT = no monitoring); and (6) at a
price of €5. This is our alternative of reference.
We estimate the probability of acceptance of this CCS option as an alternative to
the status quo for all six price points covered in the choice experiment. We simulate
six artificial choice sets in which the most preferred alternative competes with the
13 Further analyses should model the heterogeneity of individual preferences due to differences in age,
income, or online consumption.
14 Higher mean WTP for a CCS with temporal restrictions may be counterintuitive. The choice
experiment did encourage participants to reflect on their assessment regarding long-run consequences of
unauthorized copying and the position of rights holders. In this context, it is rational for users to prefer
CCS that strikes a compromise between immediate user interests and the position of rights holders.
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no-choice option, which stands for the status quo. At each choice set, the preferred
option is presented at a different price level. We use pair-wise confrontation of
alternatives—instead of the three-alternative choice set model used in the actual
choice experiment—to give the choice situation a closer resemblance to a real-
world choice in which a single CCS policy is presented to a user.
Table 1 and Fig. 2 present the distribution of predicted probabilities of
acceptance of the CCS alternative against the status quo and at the different price
levels. As is to be expected, the probability of user acceptance is strictly decreasing
in price. The probabilities of acceptance under each treatment are predicted from
each separate conditional logit model under the three types of participation (see
results in the Appendix 2).
5 Effects of a CCS on user and rights holder welfare
This paper is concerned with the basic question whether any CCS option would
simultaneously increase the user and rights holder welfare. For this purpose, we
adopt a conservative approach: For several parameters for which there is no precise
measure available, we deliberately pick values that will not result in overestimation
of welfare gains through a CCS. By concentrating on recorded music, we do not
address the desirable scope of a CCS across different types of copyright works. Nor
do we address the fine-tuning of the CCS in terms of product differentiation or price
discrimination, both of which would be costly to implement but might increase
aggregate user welfare and in particular the position of rights holders.
One of the fundamental decisions regarding a CCS is whether it is mandatory
or voluntary on the user side. ‘‘Mandatory’’ refers to a CCS where user
payment/participation is bundled with Internet subscription; the two are not
available separately. ‘‘Voluntary’’ refers to a CCS where user participation is
voluntary in the sense that Internet subscribers get to choose whether they want to
buy a CCS license. A mandatory CCS is an effective way to inhibit free-riding
and thus improve the provision of quasi-public goods. The disadvantage is that a
mandatory CCS offsets the market coordination between supply and demand. This
has been the main criticism of CCS raised in the economics literature so far
(Merges 2004; Liebowitz 2005). A voluntary CCS provides users with greater
flexibility. When users can opt out of the CCS, rights holder income from the
CCS depends on the demand for such a license and thus on the utility of licensed
works for users. A voluntary CCS is less effective in inhibiting free-riding,
however, when coupled with limited copyright enforcement. Due to these
differences, it is not certain whether rational users would prefer mandatory or
voluntary CCS. The calculation of the welfare implications of mandatory and
voluntary CCS is distinct, and we present them separately.
5.1 A mandatory compensation system
No mandatory CCS will be generally welfare increasing. Among users, WTP is too
varied, many users have a WTP of zero, and price discrimination and/or product
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differentiation will be restricted in practice.15 Median user WTP for any CCS option
covered is to reject it (WTP\ €5). Mean WTP marks the maximum price at which
the CCS option would pass the Kaldor–Hicks compensation test regarding only
users, leaving users at large no worse off than under the status quo. We first
calculate the aggregate user value and the potential revenues that could be generated
Table 1 Predicted probability of acceptance (WTP C price) of a CCS at different price levels and under
three treatment conditions (SE in parenthesis)
Price (€/month) Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary stricter
Probability (SE) Probability (SE) Probability (SE)
5 0.4532
(0.0138)
0.4464
(0.0138)
0.4457
(0.0135)
10 0.3892
(0.0138)
0.3851
(0.0138)
0.3810
(0.0134)
15 0.3287
(0.0138)
0.3272
(0.0137)
0.3202
(0.0133)
20 0.2734
(0.0136)
0.2741
(0.0136)
0.2650
(0.0131)
25 0.2244
(0.0132)
0.2267
(0.0133)
0.2163
(0.0126)
30 0.1819
(0.0126)
0.1855
(0.0127)
0.1744
(0.0119)
Fig. 2 Predicted probability of acceptance (WTP C price) of a CCS at different price levels and under
three treatment conditions, with 95 % confidence intervals
15 In this paper, we focus on a uniform charge for a CCS user license. Price discrimination and product
differentiation is tricky because some social groups with below-average income—and thus probably the
greatest disutility of a CCS fee—such as students or (young) unemployed—are on average more engaged
with unauthorized copying.
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by the CCS option. Then, we deduct estimated costs of operating the CCS, to gauge
the amount distributed among rights holders. We compare estimated CCS revenues
to rights holder revenues under the status quo, in order to establish whether the CCS
would increase rights holder profits. We can thus establish whether a CCS would
provide a Pareto improvement in the broad sense of simultaneously making users
and rights holders at large better off.
Later on, we discuss a number of extensions regarding the substitution of a CCS
for conventional purchasing of recorded music; the potential for product differen-
tiation and price discrimination; long-term effects; and the position of other
stakeholders, including the effect on demand for Internet subscriptions, which could
affect the impact of a CCS on social welfare.
Under a CCS that is mandatory on the user side, there will be two types of
participating users16: those with a WTP greater than the price being charged and
those with a WTP lower than the price being charged.17 The price of a CCS charged
among users establishes the division of any surplus among users and rights holders.
The net welfare effect of a mandatory CCS for users is
pUAm ¼ ð wðAÞ  pÞNðp; A; XÞ ð1Þ
where pUAm is the accumulated welfare of users, U, of a compensation system with
the attributes A, and the additional subscript m denominating mandatory par-
ticipation on the user side. The mean WTP reported in the discrete choice ex-
periment is w, which depends on the characteristics of a CCS, A. The price of the
CCS license for users is p. The number of households with Internet subscription in
the Netherlands is N. The number of Internet subscriptions is used—rather than the
number of individuals aged 15 or older—to avoid overestimation: The payment
mechanism described in the discrete choice experiment was a surcharge coupled
with the payment for Internet subscription. In multi-person households, one Internet
subscription is typically shared by all members of the household, so that respondents
may have considered the WTP for a CCS for all household members rather than
their individual valuation of a CCS. N depends on the price and attributes of the
CCS, as well as the price and attributes of Internet services associated with the CCS,
X. We assume X is unaffected by the CCS, and we relegate the discussion of
demand for Internet subscription for later.
Users with a lower WTP than the price will suffer under a mandatory CCS,
whereas those with a higher WTP will benefit. To prepare for a comparison with a
voluntary CCS, a separate assessment of users who gain and users who lose is of
interest. Equation 1 can be extended to
16 We are assuming a great number of users being distributed in terms of their WTP over a continuous
probability function starting at zero (and a spike at zero), and the price of the CCS being lower than the
maximum WTP in the population of users (the upper bound of the support). We thus focus on the
individual position of users and exclude any disutility that users may have from others participating in a
CCS.
17 For simplicity, we ignore any users with a WTP that is equal to price. Indifferent users cancel out of
the welfare analysis.
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pUAm ¼ ð whðAÞ  pÞnhðp; A; XÞ  ð wlðAÞ  pÞnlðp; A; XÞ ð2Þ
where subscript h denominates users with a WTP higher than p, and subscript
l denominates users with a WTP lower than p.
To establish the welfare effect of a CCS on rights holders, the relevant
comparison is that between total rights holder profits under the status quo and
prospective profits under a CCS. Our focus is on estimating monetary rewards
from sales of copies to users rather than non-monetary rewards or rights holder
profits from markets for related goods and services. This partial measure of
welfare of rational rights holders, pR, is the difference between total revenues/
income of rights holders, I, and total costs suffered by rights holders, C, that is
pR ¼ I  C:
The effect of a CCS on rights holder welfare compared to the status quo is
pRA ¼ ðIA  CAÞ  ðIS  CSÞ  B ¼ IA  IS  CA þ CS  B ð3Þ
where subscript S stands for status quo, subscript A for a specific combination
of CCS attributes, and B stands for the operating costs of the CMO, assuming
that the CMO covers its costs by a deduction from collected royalties. This is
the predominant way of financing existing CMO so that the operating costs of
that organization reduce rights holder revenues rather than increase their costs.
For simplicity and since B is probably small, we assume B to be a constant
share of the collection amount independent of the number of rights holders,
users, and thus of the price charged.18 A CCS will not decrease rights holder
profits if
IA  CA  B IS  CS ð4Þ
Data on rights holder revenues are accessible, whereas information on costs and
thus profits is not. We focus on estimating revenues for now and will discuss costs
separately below. Rights holder revenues with a mandatory CCS on the user side
associated with Internet subscription are
IAm ¼ pN p; A; Xð Þ  B ð5Þ
Overall, the short-run effect of a mandatory CCS on the welfare of both types of
stakeholders, PAm, is
PAm ¼ pUAm þ pRAm ð6Þ
Substituting pUAm and pRAm for their specifications in Eqs. 1, 3, and 5 results in
PAm ¼ ð wðAÞ  pÞNðp; AÞ þ pNðp; A; XÞ  IS  CAm þ CS  B ð7Þ
We adopt a conservative approach in estimating mean WTP, given that we only
have information on a limited number of price points and no empirical estimates of
18 The distribution rate of the main CMO concerned with recorded music in the Netherlands, Buma/
Stemra, was 95% in 2013—see also the discussion below.
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the shape of the demand curve between and beyond these points (Bateman et al.
2002). We assume that the probability of an individual’s WTP being no lower than a
price point covered in the survey is equal to the probability of WTP being equal to
the next highest price point covered, and we count reported WTP of the maximum
price covered in the survey as equal to that amount. We thus estimate users’ mean
WTP through the following step function
wAm ¼
X
p2P
hw p p  pj1
 
for p 2 P ¼ 5; 10; . . .; 30f g ð8Þ
with hw p denominating the probability of WTP being at least equal to a price, that
is, the ratio of the number of respondents accepting the CCS option at a price and
the total number of respondents, which ranges between 0 and 1.
This estimate of mean average WTP, wAm, in our sample of the Dutch population
is €9.25 per month. That amount is the cautious estimation of the maximum price
for a license at which a CCS would pass the Kaldor–Hicks compensation criterion
among users, if all individuals were to participate and pay. At this price, aggregate
user surplus is zero. Below this price, users are on average better off than under the
status quo.
The population of the Netherlands in 2013 was 16.78 million, and average
household size was 2.2 according to Eurostat (2014a, b), so that the number of
households in the country is about 7.63 million. In 2013, 95 % of the Dutch
population aged between 16 and 74 years had Internet access at home. Assuming
that all households are equally likely to have Internet access, the relevant number of
households with Internet connection is 7.25 million.19 Multiplied by average WTP
of €9.25 per month and 12 months per year, the aggregate WTP of users for the
CCS is €804.8 million per year.
The main CMO concerned with recorded music in the Netherlands, Buma/
Stemra, has had a net distribution ratio of ca. 95 % in 2012, including allocations for
social and cultural purposes. This is high by international standards, but it is
probable that CMO’s monitoring and enforcement costs of a CCS would be low
compared to royalties from mechanical reproduction or public performance rights,
for example.20 Overall, the estimated amount that could be distributed among rights
holders would thus be in the order of €764.6 million.
Industry statistics provide us with a reasonable indication of rights holder income
under the status quo, IS. For the year 2012, the most recent report of the IFPI (2013)
estimates rights holder revenues in the market for recorded music in the Netherlands
19 This is a rough estimation. Besides the simplifying assumption that households of all sizes are equally
likely to have an Internet subscription, we do not control for a probable greater proportion of individuals
younger than 15 (that were not included into the survey but may have increased older cohabitants’ WTP)
in multi-person households, or for multiple places of residence with Internet subscription.
20 This estimate of the operating cost of a CCS, B, as a fixed percentage of the collected sum has the
advantage of being simple and related to observed operating costs. It has the disadvantage that it treats
CCS operating costs as variable, when it is highly probable that there are high fixed costs and low variable
costs in operating a CCS.
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at €143.6 million.21 For lack of better data, we assume that a CCS substitutes for all
conventional purchases of recorded music.
An adequate CCS that is mandatory on the user side could thus increase rights
holder revenues by up to ca. €621 million, without making users at large worse off.
A mandatory CCS would be most acceptable if neither users nor rights holders
were worse off in the short run. So far, we have discussed the upper bound of this
range of the price for a mandatory CCS, where the price is equal to mean user WTP
so that there is no effect on aggregate user welfare. The lower bound is found at the
monthly price, pe, at which a mandatory CCS would generate annual rights holder
revenues equal to current rights holder revenues from selling recorded music to
private households in the Netherlands22
pe  pNd ¼ IS
12
ð9Þ
where IS current rights holder revenues reported on an annual basis, and d is the
proportion of the collected CCS fees distributed after covering CCS operating costs,
assumed to be 95 %. Assuming the number of Internet subscriptions, N, is unaf-
fected, a CCS fee of ca. €1.74 per household with Internet subscription would
generate the same revenues to rights holders as current revenues in the Dutch market
for recorded music.
Overall, there is a wide range of mandatory CCS fees between €1.74 and €9.25 in
which both users and rights holders would be better off compared to the status quo.
Table 2 provides an overview of the effects of the mandatory CCS option for
various prices. Since we assume the operating costs of the CCS increase in the
collection sum, the total effect on social welfare decreases with revenues to rights
holders (and thus price). Prices higher than average WTP would not be desirable,
since they would lead to excessive allocation of resources to the creation of
recorded music.
5.2 A voluntary compensation system
With a voluntary CCS, there is no negative effect on user welfare, as low-WTP
users do not participate. The total effect on user welfare is then
21 The IFPI (2013) reports revenues at ‘‘trade value’’ from the physical market for recorded music of
US$125.2 and for the digital market of US$58.9. We recalculate to € using the exchange rate of 0.78
reported in IFPI (2013). The IFPI data are derived from data reported by NVPI (2013), which estimates
total revenues at retail value in the Dutch market for recorded music at €189.6 in 2012. The direction of
our results also holds using these retail values.In the Netherlands, a copying levy on ICT hardware
collected just over €5.3 million (WIPO 2013) in 2012. Collected sums for 2013 were substantially higher
([€20 million), and some of this is distributed among rights holders to recorded music. For lack of precise
data, we do not incorporate these revenues into our analysis, so that our results relate to a situation in
which the copying levy would coexist with a CCS regarding Internet subscription. Given the modest size
of the copying levy revenues for music rights holders, it would not affect the general direction of our
results if copying levies were replaced by a CCS regarding Internet subscriptions.
22 We ignore purchases of recorded music by the 5% of Dutch households without Internet connection
that would not be directly affected by a CCS.
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pUAv ¼ whðAÞ  pð ÞDv p; Að Þ ð10Þ
where subscript v stands for voluntary and Dv for the demand for a voluntary CCS
license, which is equivalent to the number of rights holders with a WTP greater than
the price of this license, nh. For simplicity, we present this as Eq. 2 without the low-
WTP users. Of course, at any given price and CCS option, the number of voluntarily
participating users and their mean WTP will not be the same as in a mandatory
system, due to any effect of the mandatory/voluntary attribute on WTP, for instance
if users value the option of cancelling the CCS in principle or in case their pref-
erences change.
The number of participating users with a voluntary CCS will be lower than with a
mandatory CCS, since low-WTP users can opt out. Rights holder revenues with a
voluntary CCS on the user side associated with Internet subscription are
IAv ¼ pDv p; A; Xð Þ  B ð11Þ
Here, Internet subscription and the CCS are not necessarily bundled, so that
X affects the maximum number of users participating in the CCS and is otherwise
irrelevant for the number of CCS participants. A voluntary CCS can only increase
demand for Internet subscription, if the CCS does not adversely affect the supply of
creative works in the long run.
Table 2 Summary of results for a mandatory compensation system
p CS fee (€/month) hw[ p DpRAm pUAm PAm
Probability
of WTP
exceeding p
Change in rights
holder revenues
(€ million/year)
Aggregate effect
on user welfare
(€ million/year)
Combined
welfare effecta
(€ million/year)
Price points covered
in the choice
experiment
5 0.4532 269.66 370.07 639.73
10 0.3892 682.91 -64.93 617.98
15 0.3287 1096.16 -499.93 596.23
20 0.2734 1509.41 -934.93 574.48
25 0.2244 1922.66 -1369.93 552.73
30 0.1819 2335.91 -1804.93 530.98
wAm
Mean WTP
9.25b 621.23 0 621.23
pe
Price at which
rights holders are
fully compensated
1.74 0 653.92 653.92
Based on 7.25 million Dutch households with Internet connection; assuming complete substitution of
conventional record industry revenues of €164.7 million per year by the CS; assuming a distribution rate
of CCS revenues of 95 %
a Without deducting 5 % CCS operating costs of collected fees, combined welfare is constant at €653.92
million between a CCS fee of €1.74 and €30 per month
b Using the lower bounds of the 95 % confidence intervals of hw p for each price point covered in the
choice experiment, mean WTP is €9.01. Using the upper bound, mean WTP is €9.50
J Cult Econ (2016) 40:227–259 245
123
The overall effect of a voluntary CCS on social welfare, PAv, is
PAv ¼ pUAv þ DpRAv
¼ ð whðAÞ  pÞDvðp; A; XÞ þ pnhðp; AÞ  IS  CAv þ CS  B
ð12Þ
A monopolistic CMO administering a CCS would set the profit-maximizing price
of the online license for recorded music. We continue focussing on the short run,
over which the costs of creating new copyright works is irrelevant. The operating
costs of a CCS are uncertain. We thus estimate the revenue-maximizing price of a
CCS charged among voluntary users.
The discrete choice experiment produced probabilities of a respondents’ WTP
exceeding, hw p h 2 0; . . .; 1j , for six price points. We use linear OLS regression of
these probabilities and price to describe the relationship of voluntary participation in
a CCS and price as hw p ¼ a bp. Multiplying by the size of the relevant
population, we get a linear demand function within the range of prices covered in
the choice experiment of the shape23
DAv ¼ a bpð ÞN ð13Þ
With this linear model of demand, the revenue-maximizing price, p*, for a
voluntary CCS license is found at
p ¼ a
2b
ð14Þ
The monthly price at which a voluntary CCS would fully compensate rights
holders for complete substitution of conventional purchases by CCS users, pe, is
pe  phw pNd ¼ IS
12
ð15Þ
As in Eq. 9, we include a measure of IS per year as this tends to be the only data
that are reliably available. Assuming that there is no correlation between WTP for a
CCS and conventional purchasing, pe is a constant across all CCS options covered
in this paper at ca. €1.74.24
The revenue-maximizing price, p, falls between prices for which we have
empirical estimates. To estimate p, we use the linear regression of price points
23 This results in R2 = .995, so that little is gained from fitting alternative regression models.
24 It is not clear whether there should be a positive or negative correlation between WTP for a CCS and
conventional purchasing. On the one hand, taste for music is positively related with WTP for a CCS and
with conventional music purchasing. On the other hand, conventional purchasing is very probably an
indication of a preference for this way of accessing recorded music over unauthorized copying. Much of
this preference for conventional purchases should remain in case a CCS offers a legal license for copying
and use of copyright works online, since in the Netherlands there is hardly any enforcement against
private copying from unlawful sources under the status quo. In any case, our basic result—that there is a
range of CCS options and prices over which rights holder revenues and user welfare would
simultaneously be greater than in the current situation—holds even in the extreme case of complete
substitution by voluntary CCS for all conventional purchases (i.e., a complete substitution and perfect
correlation between voluntary participation in a CCS and music purchasing).
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covered in the choice experiment and the respective probabilities of participation,
hw p; see the documentation in notes (2) of Table 3. We estimate the average WTP,
whAv, of users with a WTP greater than p through the following step function
whAv ¼
X
p2P
hw[ p p  pj1
 
for p 2 P ¼ 5; 10; . . .; p; . . .; 30f g p ð16Þ
For a voluntary CCS with a flat monthly fee and no changes to the strength of
copyright enforcement, the revenue-maximizing price, p*, is €23.43, at which
24.53 % of the sample would purchase. If this amount were collected per
voluntarily participating household with Internet subscription, total revenues would
be €500.2 million.
Deducting 5 % operating costs of the CCS, the amount distributed among rights
holders would be €475.2 million. This is more than three times current revenues to
the recorded music industry of €143.6 million, not all of which would be substituted
by a voluntary CCS in which only a minority of households participates. Assuming
conservatively that the CCS would substitute for all conventional music purchases
among participating users and that WTP for a CCS and music purchasing are
uncorrelated, this voluntary CCS would increase rights holder revenues by €439.9
million.
At the ‘‘fully compensating’’ price, pe, CCS revenues for rights holders would be
equal to current revenues in the market for sound recordings (assuming complete
substitution for conventional purchases among all CCS users and no correlation
between the probability to participate in a CCS and conventional purchasing).
Results for this price point as reported in Table 3 for the voluntary CCS option
require some explanation. The price pe falls below the range of price points covered
in the survey. We thus assume conservatively that the participation rate is equal to
the lowest price point covered, €5, and that the mean WTP of users with a WTP
greater than pe is equal to the mean of the entire sample, including low-WTP users.
This explains the low estimates of user welfare and combined welfare at pe.
Assuming the approximately linear, inverse relationship between price and
participation rate we find for the empirically assessed price points were to hold
between pe and €5, aggregate user welfare would be much larger and combined
welfare would exceed that for any other price point. The results for the mandatory
CCS option illustrate this: There, no estimate of the probability of acceptance is
required, and combined welfare at pe exceeds the value for all other price points.
At a CCS fee of €5 per month, 44.6 % of the respondents would voluntarily
participate in a CCS without greater copyright enforcement. Except for our
conservative estimate of the values at pe—see above—the combined welfare effect
of a CCS strictly decreases with price. That could be offset by any supply effect in
the long run, which is not included in the analysis, except in the sense that
respondents may have incorporated their own expectations of long-term conse-
quences into their evaluation of the CCS proposals. Another way to put this is that
our data from the discrete choice experiment may not fully reflect the costs of
creating new copyright works and the depreciation of the existing stock of copyright
works.
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The desirable range of prices for a voluntary CCS is ca. €1.74–€23.43 per month.
Even at the upper bound that maximizes the collection amount of the CCS for rights
holders, some user surplus remains, but the participation rate is low (24.5 %).
Table 3 Summary of results for a voluntary compensation system with no changes to copyright
enforcement
p
Monthly CCS fee (€)
hw p wh DpRAm pUAm PAm
Probability
of
participation
Mean WTP of
participating
users
(€/month)
Annual
change in
rights holder
revenues
(€ million/
year)
Aggregate
effect on
user
welfare
(€ million/
year)
Combined
welfare
effect
(€ million/
year)
Price points
covered in the
choice
experiment
5 0.434 20.66 120.37 608.35 728.72
10 0.373 23.16 262.96 440.85 703.80
15 0.316 25.49 358.62 298.53 657.15
20 0.264 27.52 413.72 179.30 593.02
25 0.218 29.09 435.93 80.68 516.60
30 0.178 30 433.22 0a 433.22
p*
Revenue-
maximizing
price
23.42b 0.2368b 28.85b 439.94c 111.92c 530.00c
pe
Price at which
rights holders
are fully
compensated
1.74 0.4464d 9.22d 0 [290.77e [290.77e
Based on 7.25 million Dutch households with Internet connection; assuming complete substitution of
conventional record industry revenues for all users participating in the CS; assuming a distribution rate of
CCS revenues of 95 %
a No WTP greater than €30 could be recorded by respondents. The zero reported here is an artifact of
that. This cap may lead to an underestimation of user welfare, pUAm. The advantage is that we limit the
potential for high ‘‘protest bids’’
b We derive the revenue-maximizing price—and the probability of voluntary participation at this price—
from the results of a linear regression of the six price points covered in the choice experiment and the
respective probabilities of a participation, hw p, which results in hw p ¼ 0:49075  0:01047p, with an
R2 = 0.995. For simplicity, we report results for that price point that maximizes the collection sum of the
CCS
c Since we are using a step function to calculate the effect of a CCS on user welfare and rights holder
income (see Eq. 16), the results reported here are somewhat below maximal revenues based on regression
results
d Rather than extrapolating beyond the price range covered in the choice experiment, we use hw p for the
lowest price covered, €5 (following Bateman et al. 2002). Since demand is very probably a strictly
decreasing function, we thus underestimate hw p at pe
e We report wh for the lowest price point included into the choice experiment, €5; wh for €1.74 should
range between the mean for the entire sample, w, of €9.224, and wh for €5, €20.66. That is, user welfare,
pUAm, and the combined welfare effect, PAm, at pe are probably substantially higher. If hw p is strictly
increasing in price over the lower price range not covered in the choice experiment, PAm at pe is greater
than at €5 (€728.72 million)
248 J Cult Econ (2016) 40:227–259
123
Table 2 and Fig. 2 display the participation probabilities for the voluntary CCS
option under two treatments: one with and one without greater copyright
enforcement. There are no significant differences. Therefore, we do not present
separate estimates of the CCS option with greater copyright enforcement. With an
affordable voluntary CCS available, there would be stronger moral justification for
copyright enforcement among users opting out. Our results do indicate, however,
that investments in stronger enforcement are not essential to make a voluntary CCS
‘‘work’’ in the sense that rights holder revenues are increased without making users
worse off.25 In any case, the operationalization of the concept of ‘‘stronger
copyright enforcement’’ in the choice experiment was challenging and the
instructions to respondents eventually left relatively great scope for varied
interpretation.
Comparing the voluntary with the mandatory CCS options, the greater flexibility
and adaptability of a voluntary CCS comes at a price for rights holders: Prospective
CCS revenues to rights holders are lower with the voluntary option. Nevertheless,
the voluntary CCS could increase rights holder revenues up to a factor of three. User
welfare and combined welfare tend to be greater with a voluntary option, at least up
to a price of €15. These results also suggest that the main long-run problem
identified with CCS by economists so far—the offsetting of the coordination of
supply and demand through prices—can be mitigated through a voluntary CS.
With a voluntary CCS and revenue-maximizing pricing, about three quarters of
the population of users would not participate in the CCS, and the prospective
participation rate never exceeds 50 % for any price point empirically assessed. A
voluntary CCS would thus have the disadvantage that illegitimate use would very
probably still occur frequently, which could be costly to society.
6 Extensions and limitations
This paper is focused on the direct effects of a CCS on the position of the immediate
stakeholders in the market for recorded music, users, and rights holders. Due to a
lack of valid information on costs, the focus is on revenues rather than profits
regarding the rights holder position. This does not cover all important consequences
of a CCS. We discuss further effects here (for a more extensive discussion, see
Handke 2014).
6.1 Costs for rights holders
There is little valid information on production costs and transaction costs suffered
by rights holders. However, it is probable that a CCS reduces a number of rights
holder costs. Compared to the market for physical sound carriers, there are no costs
of manufacturing, distribution of physical goods, and excess production or lost sales
25 The intuition is that the treatment of ‘‘stricter copyright enforcement’’ could have invoked some
protest zeros and/or strategic responses, which could have biased the evaluation of CCS options
downwards under this treatment.
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due to false predictions of demand for specific works. Compared to the current
markets for digital downloads and streams, the costs of enforcing copyrights will
fall with a CCS. Furthermore, if peer-to-peer dissemination of music would increase
even more with a CCS, the costs of retailing and distribution on the professional
supplier side could also decrease. On the other hand, it is not apparent that any costs
for rights holders would increase (estimates of CCS operating costs are already
included into our calculations). It seems clear that the costs suffered by the rights
holder would not be greater with a CCS than at the status quo, CA CS.
However, an effective system of measuring use of works online seems essential
for a CCS. Among rights holders and in the short-run analysis, any distortion in the
distribution of revenues with a CCS compared to direct transactions cancels out if
all revenues in excess of the operating costs of the CCS are distributed. In the long
run, a distorted distribution of revenues could adversely affect incentives to invest in
high-quality works. The main difference to monitoring associated with enforcement
of copying restrictions is that this assessment could occur without an adversarial
approach and could be restricted to an anonymized sample of the population of CCS
users.
6.2 Long-term effects on the supply of recorded music
It is improbable that the participants in our choice experiment fully incorporated the
long-run effects on the supply of recorded music when evaluating CCS options. For
example, there may be a tendency to underestimate changes in the quantity and
quality of works supplied and in particular the flow of new works introduced to the
market. The greatest promise of an adequate CCS—that would make rights holders
better off than the status quo—is that it could trigger additional investments in
creativity, mitigating market failure in the provision of quasi-public goods
compared to current market conditions with frequent, uncompensated unauthorized
use. A CCS that provides a relatively simple and general standard way of managing
copyrights on the Internet could also remove barriers to entry for new services
regarding the dissemination and use of music online; see Sect. 6.5.26
Furthermore, less legal restrictions on the use of music online could trigger taste
formation regarding music (Caves 2000; Towse 2003; Ginsburgh and Throsby
2006), learning about existing related technologies and foster user innovation. It is
unlikely that the choice experiment fully captures such long-term effects.
6.3 Price discrimination and product differentiation
For simplicity, we focus on a standard license with a uniform price set per
household with Internet subscription. Price discrimination and product differen-
tiation could improve the social welfare effect of a CCS.
26 For some preliminary evidence on substantial transaction costs in the clearing of copyrights for online
music services, see KEA (2012).
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6.4 Effects on other music purchases
We lack information in particular on the substitution of a CCS for conventional
purchases of recorded music. Credible cross-elasticities of demand between a CCS
and conventional purchases are difficult to establish in a survey. We thus take the
conservative approach of assuming perfect substitution—any CCS users would
never purchase recorded music on physical carriers, paid-for downloads or streams,
or pay for subscription services. In practice, the substitution rate will not be 100 %,
so that our estimates of the welfare gain of CCS are underestimated in this respect.27
Furthermore, we do not address effects on markets for related goods and services
supplied by music rights holders. The live music business is estimated to generate
much greater revenues than recorded music. It is improbable that a CCS would have
a strong adverse effect on demand for live music or commercial music licensing.
6.5 Retailing and other dissemination of recorded music
This section is focused on enterprises disseminating downloads or streams of
copyrighted works online or providing closely related services, not traditional
retailers selling works on physical sound carriers.28 When data were collected,
unauthorized copying and use of musical recordings were common in the
Netherlands, and a substantial share of record industry revenues in the Netherlands
came from Internet-based, authorized retailers of recorded music. The WTP
reported in this study reflects the additional expected user value of a CCS compared
to a status quo with authorized commercial music services online, including music
subscription services.
Commercial enterprises disseminating works online fall into two categories:
First, firms that operate under a licensing agreement with rights holders such as the
iTunes store, Spotify, or Youtube (authorized digital retailers); second, enterprises
that facilitate the dissemination of works online without authorization from rights
holders such as ‘‘peer-to-peer’’ networks, BitTorrent sites, and file hosters
(‘‘unlawful sources’’ or unauthorized disseminators). With a CCS, information on
unauthorized use needs to be considered to avoid gross inefficiencies in the
distribution of revenues. If so, unauthorized use would raise revenues to rights
27 A caveat is that when estimating the substitution effect of a voluntary CCS, we assumed no correlation
between conventional music purchasing and WTP for a CCS. Purchasing of recorded music is highly
concentrated on a minority of individuals, and frequent buyers of recorded music could be more likely to
opt-in to a voluntary CCS. For the voluntary CCS option, the substitution for conventional purchases
might then be even higher than our estimate of substitution proportional to the participation rate in the
CCS. Note however that users with a taste for music have been found to purchase recorded music in
multiple formats (Gopal et al. 2006) and have a higher WTP for authorized copies (e.g., Rob and
Waldfogel 2006).
28 Regarding retailers of physical sound carriers, this segment of the market has been declining for a long
time. A CCS that makes Internet-based dissemination of copyright works more efficient would aggravate
this and speed up the ‘‘digitization’’ of the market for recorded music, with physical sound carriers being
relegated even more rapidly to a niche of collectibles and high-value users. Traditional retailers would
face even more rapidly declining demand, digital retailers at large would face greater demand, and users
as well as rights holders could gain from interaction through a less costly intermediation system.
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holders roughly proportional to the scale and scope of use of specific works. This
will make rights holders less likely to struggle against unauthorized use—or lobby
governments to do so—depending on the CCS price and revenue distribution
method.
A CCS has three basic effects for online disseminators. First, fees charged by
rights holders for authorization of such services will fall. A CCS generates income
to rights holders from online dissemination of works independent of more direct
payments from online disseminators. Subject to the CCS revenues and distribution
scheme, it will thus be rational for rights holders to charge lower fees for the rights
to disseminate works online. According to our results, it is possible to set a CCS
price so that users and rights holders are both on average better off than under the
status quo, even if rights holders do not charge online disseminators at all. Second, a
CCS reduces transaction costs by defining standard terms for online dissemination
of works. Third, it facilitates market entry and promotes competition between
enterprises disseminating works online.
Standard terms of trade that provide legal certainty and stable conditions for a
wide range of music dissemination services would reduce uncertainty and facilitate
market entry. Market entry in this context has two meanings. First, it refers to new,
for-profit firms entering the market. Second, existing unauthorized services or user-
led innovation—including those facilitating ‘‘peer-to-peer’’ exchanges—might be
incorporated more fully into the market if these activities generate income to rights
holders. A CCS thus has the potential to lower barriers to entry for legitimate music
dissemination services, which currently tends toward narrow oligopolies or quasi-
monopolies. Disseminators would have to compete less on their ability to strike
relatively good licensing agreements or avoid copyright enforcement measures, and
more on offering convenient access to a wide range of music, ways of organizing
music collections, recommendation systems and user–user interaction or even user–
creator interaction. The market for music retailing services of all types would
become more contestable and more focused on services that directly concern end
users.
However, in the current legal and political context, it seems highly probable that
(1) a distinction and separate treatment of non-private/commercial unauthorized use
would be upheld, and (2) non-private use would require explicit consent from rights
holders. (The legal conception of ‘‘non-private/commercial’’ often entails not only
direct pecuniary income from advertising or fees charged to users, but also
considers the scale of unauthorized use and any restrictions on access.) Then, the
potential of a CCS to reduce transaction costs and promote competition in digital
markets for copyright works would not be fully exploited. The distinction between
private and non-private use is hard to make, so that many stakeholders would still
suffer from uncertainty. Furthermore, even with a CCS, non-private disseminators
of music online would incur the fixed costs of negotiating specific agreements with
relevant rights holders (or face legal risks). The alternative is blanket licensing
under collective rights management also for commercial use online. That could
come about spontaneously or through a compulsory license, such as that in place
already in the USA for digital audio transmission, for example (United States
Copyright Office 2011).
252 J Cult Econ (2016) 40:227–259
123
Overall, a CCS would probably strongly affect existing music dissemination services
online, and it has ambiguous effects for suppliers of such services. On the one hand, a
CCS would increase the transparency of the market for recorded music, could reduce
the scope for prolonged negotiations and hold-up problems, and the fees charged by
rights holders would in all probability fall. On the other hand, the appropriability
conditions for current online retailers could become less favorable, reducing
commercial incentives to invest in music retailing services. However, there has been
an abundant supply of unauthorized streams and downloads online over the last
15 years in spite of the legal risks involved. A CCS could remove some of the legal
uncertainty and develop mutually beneficial arrangements between rights holders and
disseminators of works. It then seems unlikely that a CCS would diminish the supply of
music dissemination services online, and it might even make it more efficient.29
6.6 The effect of demand for Internet subscription and related services
The direct effect of a voluntary CCS on demand for Internet subscription could only
be to increase demand, since a voluntary CCS would simply be another
complementary good available for those users with a WTP greater than the price
of a CCS license.
By contrast, a mandatory CCS enforces the bundling of a CCS with Internet
subscription. With incomplete price discrimination and product differentiation
applied to the CCS, a number of potential users could cancel their Internet
subscription because of a mandatory CCS. First, this depends on the user fee for the
CCS license. We find that a mandatory CCS priced in the reasonable range of
€1.74–€9.25 would make at least 45.3 % to 38.9 % of the sample better off,
boosting demand for Internet subscription among this sizable minority. Second, due
to competition among ISP, prices for Internet subscription (and other services
provided online) should be well in the inelastic range. What is more, the cost of
Internet subscription (ca. €20 per month) is much greater than any reasonable
mandatory CCS fee. The literature on bundling further illustrates that for
information goods with low variable costs, bundling tends to increase supplier
profits (Belleflamme and Peitz 2010), unless the bundled goods are good substitutes.
Overall, it is improbable that a well-designed CCS would have a strong adverse
effect on demand for Internet subscription and related services, unless the CCS fee
exceeds the reasonable range specified above.
7 Conclusions
The results of our choice experiment indicate that a well-designed CCS for recorded
music would make users and rights holders better off. A monthly CCS fee of ca.
€1.74 as a surcharge on Dutch Internet subscriptions would raise the same amount
29 Standardization of music licensing through a CCS would probably also increase competition among
suppliers of musical works (except for competition on the basis of licensing). Then, rights holders who
enjoy a relatively strong bargaining position with online retailers under the status quo would benefit less,
since under standard CCS arrangements, there is less scope for striking preferential deals.
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of revenues to rights holders as the entire revenues in the Dutch market for recorded
music in 2012. A conservative estimate of mean WTP reported in our choice
experiment is €9.25 for a mandatory CCS and higher for CCS options that are
voluntary on the user side.
Previous reviews of applied contingent valuation methods report mean overes-
timations of WTP by a factor of up to 3.26. If overestimation in our case would be
equal to that amount, our main conclusion regarding the desirability of a CCS holds
comfortably. It holds up to an overestimation of ca. 5.3 for both the mandatory and
voluntary CCS options. It is particularly noteworthy that a voluntary CCS could
increase rights holder revenues compared to the status quo, as voluntary
participation on the user side would mitigate some of the problems with centralized
pricing for copyright works a CCS does entail. Furthermore, there is the potential
that a CCS that increases rights holder profits would foster the supply of new
creative works in way that was not foreseen by participants in the choice
experiment, making a CCS even more beneficial in the long run.
To be sure, predictions of real market outcomes based on stated preferences
remain uncertain. Given our clear results, more involved experimental adoption of a
CCS seems worthwhile, as it would provide revealed preference data and illuminate
aspects and consequences that a choice experiment cannot gauge: (1) the substitution
effect of a CCS license for conventional purchases; (2) the operating costs of a CS;
(3) the effect of a CCS on rights holders’ costs; or (4) the consequences for barriers to
entry in the market for creative works and related goods and services.
It is important to note that this paper does not include the one-off costs of change
due to establishing a CCS among stakeholders, nor political considerations or legal
restrictions. Neither does it discuss detailed solutions regarding the monitoring of
use and the distribution of CCS revenues among rights holders. Therefore, it does
not develop a conclusive argument in favor of adopting a CCS. Instead, this paper
enables stakeholders and policy makers to make better-informed decisions whether
this option should be further explored.
For 15 years, there has been widespread dissatisfaction with the copyright system
online. A CCS may be the most viable option to improve this situation. According to
our results, there are CCS options that could foster growth in the market for
recorded music, and compared to the status quo, the benefits would probably be
substantial. Collective administration of copyright in this manner diverges widely
from an ideal market. Alluding back to our title, this ‘‘trouble’’ may still be the
lesser evil compared to staying stuck with rampant unauthorized and uncompen-
sated use or costly copyright enforcement measures.
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Appendix 1
See Table 4.
Table 4 Overview of conjoint attributes, levels, and instructions (translated from Dutch)
Attribute Attribute levels Level descriptions (as presented to respondents)
Allowed uses
1 Download You have the right to download copyrighted works for your
personal use from anywhere on the Internet
2 Download ? share Besides downloading, you have the right to Share works
anywhere on the Internet as long as you do not do it for a
profit
3 Download ? share ? modify Besides downloading and sharing, you will have the right to
modify (i.e., remix, combine) works and share such works
online
Subject matter
1 Music This option covers recorded music in digital form
2 Music ? audiovisual works Besides recorded music, you can use audiovisual works, such
as feature films, TV series, and other TV programs
3 Music ? audiovisual
works ? digital texts
Besides recorded music and audiovisual works, you can use
digital versions of print media, such as books and
newspaper/magazine articles
Catalogue completeness
1 Access to an incomplete
catalogue
Some rights holders may decide not to participate in the
compensation system. Their works are not available
through the system, and using them is illegal
2 Access to everything, but
only after a while
Some rights holders prefer to wait with the online release of
their works till they have broken even through other
channels
A certain time after their release, all works will be available
in the system, but using them before that is illegal
3 Access to all works You have access to all past and present works, as soon as
they are published
Monitoring
1 Anonymized monitoring Your online media use may be monitored and analyzed in an
anonymous fashion to account for the use of each work and
help achieve a fair distribution of monies
Anonymity will be legally guaranteed; thus, your identity
will not be connected to the actions monitored
2 No monitoring Legal safeguards ensure that your online media use will not
be monitored and analyzed in any fashion within the
framework of the ACS
J Cult Econ (2016) 40:227–259 255
123
Appendix 2
See Table 5.
Table 4 continued
Attribute Attribute levels Level descriptions (as presented to respondents)
Distribution of revenues
1 Artists share: minimum 50 % Regulation will set the share of individual rights holders
(artists, performers, etc.) to at least 50 % of the revenues
generated by the compensation system
2 Artists are free to negotiate Different rights holders, such as individuals (artist,
performers, etc) and corporations (recording companies,
studios, etc.) will be free to negotiate how they share the
revenues among themselves, without any outside
intervention
Price
1 €5 per month
2 €10 per month
3 €15 per month
4 €20 per month
5 €25 per month
6 €30 per month
Table 5 Parameter estimates: conditional logit model of CCS choice
Attributes Levels Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary
stricter
Allowed uses Ref. = download
Download and share -0.082**
(0.038)
-0.091**
(0.038)
-0.159***
(0.037)
Download and share and
modification
-0.363***
(0.045)
-0.378***
(0.045)
-0.384***
(0.044)
Subject matter Ref. = music
Music and AV 0.479***
(0.040)
0.449***
(0.040)
0.491***
(0.039)
Music and AV and books 0.372***
(0.047)
0.344***
(0.046)
0.306***
(0.046)
Catalogue completeness Ref. = partial catalogue
Temporal restrictions 0.207***
(0.039)
0.176***
(0.038)
0.108***
(0.038)
All works 0.132***
(0.045)
0.082*
(0.045)
0.041
(0.045)
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